CMSC 426 Principles of Computer Security

Buffers and Assembly Language

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Announcement: Note Taker Needed

A peer note taker has been requested for this class. A peer note taker is a volunteer student who provides a copy of his or her notes for each class session to another member of the class who has been deemed eligible for this service based on a disability. Peer note takers will be paid a stipend for their service.

Peer note taking is not a part time job but rather a volunteer service for which enrolled students can earn a stipend for sharing the notes they are already taking for themselves.

If you are interested in serving in this important role, please fill out a note taker application on the Student Disability Services website or in person in the SDS office in Math/Psychology 212.

Last Class We Covered

- Buffer overflow basics
- How the stack works
 - Overflowing the stack buffer
 - Example in action
- Vulnerable code
 - Finding vulnerable code
 - Avoiding vulnerable code
- Exploiting stack overflows
 Shellcode

Any Questions from Last Time?

Today's Topics

- Assembly review
- Cdecl calling convention

In-depth explanation of stack buffer overflow exploits

Assembly Review

x86 Registers

EAX, EBX, ECX, EDX

Used for general data storage

ESI, EDI

- Source and destination registers
- (Mostly used for string and buffer operations)

ESP, EBP

- Stack and base pointer
- Used for keeping track of stack frames and operations)

EIP

Instruction pointer (points to current instruction being executed)

PUSH in Assembly Language

What does PUSH actually do?

- PUSH myVal
 SUB ESP, 4
 SUB ESP, 4
 Subtract 4 from the stack pointer ("make room" on the stack)
 - MOV [ESP], myVal
 Copy the value into that new space on the stack

POP in Assembly Language

What does POP actually do?



Quick Note – Stack Growth

- The stack grows <u>down</u>
- The ESP is the "stack pointer"
 - □ Keeps track of the "top" of the stack (really the bottom)
 - The boundary between actual data and junk on the stack
- When the ESP is incremented, we are going <u>UP</u> the stack
 This means something is being <u>removed</u> from the stack
- When the ESP is decremented, we are going <u>DOWN</u> the stack
 This means space is being added to the stack for new information

CALL in Assembly Language

What does CALL actually do?



RET in Assembly Language

What does RET actually do?



- Trusting that whatever's at the top of the stack is the return address
 - When you execute the next instruction it looks at EIP to see what to do next

Cdecl

What is Cdecl?

The calling convention for the C programming language is called "cdecl"

- Calling conventions determine
 - Order in which parameters are placed onto the stack
 - Which registers are used/preserved for the caller
 - How the stack in general is handled

Simple Cdecl Example – Code

```
int myFunc(char *par1, int par2)
{
    char local1[64];
    int local2;
    return 0;
}
```

```
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    myFunc(argv[1], atoi(argv[2]);
    return 0;
```

What actually happens on the stack when this program is run?

What variables are allocated first?

```
How does the stack 
grow?
```

Simple Cdecl Example – Calling

- PUSH par2
- PUSH par1
- CALL myFunc
- PUSH EBP
- MOV EBP, ESP
- SUB ESP, 68



Simple Cdecl Example – Returning

MOV ESP, EBP

POP EBP

RET



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Example Stack Buffer Overflow Exploit

Overflow Exploit Goal

- In this example, the goal is privilege escalation
 - Gaining privileges you didn't have before



- Note that the vulnerable executable has the SUID bit set
 - Linux will run this program with the user ID and permissions of its owner (in this case, root)

Overflow Exploit Source Code (part 1)

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {

```
if (argc != 2) {
    printf("Invalid number of arguments\n");
    exit(1);
}
```

```
bof(argv[1]);
```

```
printf("Completed\n");
return 0;
```

 Simple main() for calling a function with an overflow exploit in it

Overflow Exploit Source Code (part 2)

```
int bof(char *str)
{
    char buff[512];
    strcpy(buff, str);
    printf("The length of your ",
        "string is %d\n",
```

strlen(buff));

What are we trying to exploit with this code?

 Using the unsafe function strcpy

If str is longer than
 buff, this will cause an overflow

return 0;

Stack Smashing

- The bof function tried to return to 0x41414141 (an invalid address) and caused a segfault
 0x41 is 'A' in ASCII
 - 0x41 is 'A' in ASCII

Planning the Exploit

- We can control the address that the bof function returns to if we pass it specially crafted input
 - (Instead of screaming at it)

The construction of the input will be in this form:

NOP Sled	Shellcode	Return Addresses

Planning the Exploit

- We can control the address that the bof function returns to if we pass it specially crafted input
 - (Instead of screaming at it)
- The construction of the input will be in this form:
 - □ (Sizes are also semi to scale)
 - □ 512 bytes for the buffer is pretty huge



Shellcode

- Instructions with the purpose of opening a shell
 In this example, a root shell
- It can't contain any NULL characters
 1) It's being passed in as command line input
 2) strcpy will go until it sees a NULL character
- It's often limited to a very small size

Return Addresses

- We need to figure out where the return address of bof is in order to overwrite it with our own
 - It's a bit higher on the stack than the local variables
 - □ We could do the math...
 - (Easier to pretend math doesn't exist)

 Or we can just include a bunch of copies of our return address in our exploit and hope one overwrites it

Always word aligned (so no "partial" overwrite)

Return Addresses

 We also need to decide what the value of our return address should be

 We don't know what the address of the shellcode is, but we can estimate it

ASLR == Address Space Layout Randomization
 Turning it off makes it easier to find/predict where things will be

NOP Sled

Fill a large area of memory with NOP instructions before the shellcode

If our estimate points to anywhere in the NOP sled, we'll end up executing the shellcode

Putting it all together

- The return address of bof() is overwritten and the function returns to somewhere in the NOP sled
- The NOP sled leads execution to the start of the shellcode
- The shellcode executes and we get a root shell



Writing the Exploit (Shellcode)

char shellcode[] =			
"\x31\xc0"	/* xorl	%eax,%eax	*/
" \x 50"	/* pushl	%eax	*/
"\x68""//sh"	/* pushl	\$0x68732f2f	*/
"\x68""/bin"	/* pushl	\$0x6e69622f	*/
" \x 89 \xe 3"	/* movl	%esp,%ebx	*/
" \x 50"	/* pushl	%eax	*/
" \x 53"	/* pushl	%ebx	*/
"\x89\xe1"	/* movl	%esp,%ecx	*/
"\x99"	/* cdql		*/
"\xb0\x0b"	/* movb	\$0x0b,%al	*/
"\xcd\x80"	/* int	\$0x80	*/

Will explain how this works next time (opens a root shell)

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Daily Security Tidbit

- Canadian passports have a neat security feature
- Can see more examples at
 https://imgur.com/gallery/3u8xP

